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K E N N E D Y ’S LAST TERM
Marc O. DeGirolami and Kevin C. Walsh
report on the 2017-2018 Supreme Court.

T
III

wenty-eighteen brought the

||

end

of

Justice

Anthony

Kennedy’s tenure

on

the

Supreme Court. We are now entering a period of uncertainty about
American constitutional law. Will we remain on the trajectory of the last
half-century? Or will the Court move in a different direction?
The character of the Supreme Court in closely divided cases is often
a function of the median justice. The new median justice will be Chief
Justice John Roberts if Kennedy’s replacement is a conservative likely
to vote most often with Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and
Samuel Alito. This will mark a new phase of the Roberts Court.
Marc O. DeGirolami is professor of law and associate director of the Center for Law and Religion
at St. John’s University. Kevin C. Walsh is professor of law at the University of Richmond.
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Yet the composition of the Court is not the only
important variable. The Court has been influenced—
heavily influenced, in some areas—by elite cultural
opinion as well. Where such influence has degraded
the foundations of constitutional law, a new justice,
no matter what his views, can only make a limited
difference.
Before offering some conjectures about the postKennedy Court, though, we look back at some of the
signature cases of this past term.

The dueling concurrences of Justice Elena Kagan
(joined by Justice Stephen Breyer) and Justice
Gorsuch (joined by Justice Alito) demonstrate the
deeper conflict within the Court about the future of
the First Amendment in these cases. The core of their
disagreement concerned evidence that customers who
approached other bakers to make cakes with mes
sages expressing disapproval of same-sex marriage
were refused by those bakers. Yet when those cus
tomers sued the bakers for religious discrimination,
the bakers prevailed before the Colorado Civil Rights
he term was significant for the First
Commission. Meanwhile, Phillips, who would not
Amendment. It was important for what
make a cake approving of same-sex marriage, lost
the Court said and what it did not say.
before the commission.
It highlighted disagreement between
Justice Kagan argued that this discrepancy was
the conservative and progressive wings
immaterial. These pro-same-sex-marriage bakers,
of the Court about the nature, scope, and unlike
value of
Phillips, were not engaged in the relevant kind
freedom of speech, a disagreement likely to intensify
of discrimination against “individuals based on . . .
in future years.
sexual orientation and creed,” because they would
Two First Amendment cases in particular il not have made the requested cake for any customer.
lustrated a broader asymmetry in much culture
They were neutral with respect to customers. When
war litigation. Social progressives use the courts
it comes to sexual orientation, the Court has treated
to secure and extend cultural gains, while social
conduct as inextricably connected with identity and
conservatives repair to the courts to obtain reprieves
thus deserving of protection. But for religion, Kagan
from further cultural losses. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
felt that a different rule should apply: “A vendor can
the two cases involved same-sex marriage and abor choose the products he sells, but not the customers
tion, respectively. Social conservatives won in both
he serves—no matter the reason.” A refusal to sell a
cases, but their victories are tenuous, and they were
wedding cake to couples of the same sex, she flatly
forced to litigate in the first place only because they
declared, “has nothing to do with Phillips’ religious
had lost unequivocally in the legislative and admin beliefs.”
istrative realms.
Justice Gorsuch disagreed: “It was the kind of
Both cases involved legal penalties imposed on
cake, not the kind of customer, that m attered.”
Christians for what state legislators or officials
Phillips would not have made a cake celebrating a
openly condemned as retrograde and benighted
same-sex marriage for any customer, gay or straight,
views. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil
just as the other bakers would not have made a cake
Rights Commission concerned a challenge to a state
disapproving a same-sex marriage under any circum
civil rights commission’s ruling that Jack Phillips, a
stances. And yet, argued Gorsuch, the civil rights
Christian baker, violated Colorado’s antidiscrimina commission applied one standard for Phillips and
tion laws when he declined to create a custom cake
another for the other bakers. Thus do we get an in
in celebration of a same-sex marriage. In a 7-2 de kling of where the battle will be waged in future cases
cision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court held
involving similar conflicts between First Amendment
that the commission violated the free exercise clause
freedoms and state antidiscrimination laws.
because one commissioner openly denigrated Phil
lips’s Christian view of marriage, calling it “despi
n National Institute o f Family and Life Advo
cable” and comparing it to defenses of slavery and
cates v. Becerra, the Court reviewed a challenge
the Holocaust. A second commissioner indicated that
to California regulations imposed on pro-life
religious beliefs like Phillips’s cannot be “carried into
pregnancy resource centers. One required statethe public sphere or commercial domain.” But the
licensed centers to advertise the availability of
seven-justice majority’s zone of agreement was nar
state-subsidized abortions, while a second required
row, depending especially on the first commissioner’s
unlicensed centers to notify women prominently
imprudent on-the-record vituperation. The crucial
and in several languages that they were not licensed.
decision about how to resolve the tensions in a case
(In Los Angeles, thirteen different translations were
not involving explicit hostility toward traditional
necessary.) The law manifested an intent to ta r
Christian views was thus postponed.
get “largely Christian belief-based” centers, which
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money was used only for activities “germane” to
collective bargaining rather than for what the Court
then described as separate “political and ideological
projects.” In an opinion for the Court authored by
Justice Alito on behalf of the same five-justice major
ity as in NIFLA, the Court held that these compul
sory union fees violated the freedom of speech. Such
fees forced support (in the form of financial subsidies)
for messages with which the litigants disagreed, and
Abood’s distinction between permissible and imper
missible expenditures had proved easier to articulate
than apply. “It is impossible to argue,” the majority
opinion contended, “that the level o f . . . state spend
ing for employee benefits . . . is not a matter of great
public concern.”
As in Justice Breyer’s NI FLA dissent, Justice
Kagan’s acid Janus dissent accused the majority
of “weaponizing” the freedom of speech. Kagan
denounced the justices in the majority as “blackrobed rulers overruling citizen choices” and cen
sured them for “turning the First Amendment into
a sword” with which to smite democracy. “The First
Amendment,” she lectured, “was meant for better
things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect
democratic governance.”
One might have thought that the function of con
stitutional rights was precisely to protect against
certain democratic choices, even those not involving
the sexual mores and secular proclivities of the elite
classes. Janus, at least, involved a freedom with a firm
textual anchor in the Constitution, rather than one
invented by the Court in response to the felt impera
tives of the forward cultural march. But the weap
onization metaphor was minted about five years ago
to attack religious freedom, when the Hobby Lobby
case evoked so much outrage. It is sobering to see
four justices now deploying it against the freedom
of speech.
Notwithstanding the rhetorical warfare of the
NIFLA and Janus dissenters, both of these decisions
do showcase the C ourt’s increasing embrace of a
robustly libertarian conception of the First Amend
ment—one which has been ascendant for at least a
half century. Yet if the libertarian freedom of speech
is now serving conservative ends, one should remem
ber that for decades it promoted socially progres
erhaps the most controversial First Amend
ment case of the term was Janus v. Ameri sive ends in the Court’s cases involving defamation,
obscenity, sexually explicit speech, and many other
can Federation o f State, County, and
twentieth-century expansions of free speech. Liber
Municipal Employees, in which the Court
tarian freedom of speech can support very different
struck down an Illinois law that compelled
nonmembers to pay public-sector union fees.ideological
The
projects.
Indeed, First Amendment doctrine from the late
Court reversed Abood v. Detroit Board o f Education,
1960s through the early 1980s was largely function
the late 1970s decision that held compulsory publicalist, involving unabashed policy judgments and the
sector agency fees were constitutional, so long as the

California state legislators believed were not suffi
ciently “forward thinking” about abortion, as re
corded in the statute’s legislative history.
In a 5 -4 opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas held
that the statute violated the freedom of speech. Its
provisions compelled the centers to express contentspecific messages, including about obtaining the very
service to which the centers objected: abortion. The
Court emphatically rejected the claim that “profes
sional speech” is a distinctive category that may be
regulated more extensively than others. And it also
relied on the difference between speech and conduct
in distinguishing cases like Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, which held that abortion providers could be
required by the state, over their free speech objec
tions, to obtain informed consent before performing
an abortion. Those cases, Thomas argued, did not
apply because the pro-life centers in N1FLA were
not performing abortions. He noted that California
had selectively exempted general practice medical fa
cilities from the same requirements that it imposed
on the pro-life centers, suggesting that the state of
California had an illegitimate interest in compelling
precisely these facilities to advertise state-sponsored
abortion. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by
Justice Gorsuch, argued that the regulations were
intended to squelch the pro-life views of the centers:
“It is not forward thinking to force individuals to ‘be
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view [they] fin[d] unacceptable.’”
Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices
Kagan, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor.
If a state may require an abortion provider to tell a
woman seeking an abortion about adoption services
(as the Court had held in Casey), Breyer argued, it
should also be able to require pro-life centers to tell
a woman about the availability of state-subsidized
abortion. The dissent went further, charging that the
majority had empowered pro-life centers “to use the
Constitution as a weapon” to defeat “reasonable”
“economic and social laws.” It would not be the last
time this term that these justices would employ the
metaphor of constitutional weaponization as to the
freedom of speech.
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crude balancing of competing political and economic
considerations. Over the past few decades, by con
trast, the C ourt’s preferred approach has become
more formalist, turning on categories and rule-based
doctrinal formulations. The Roberts Court’s over
ruling of Abood in Janus can thus be understood as
what Villanova law professor Michael Moreland has
aptly called the end of the free speech disco era.
Much of the disagreement between Justice Alito’s
majority opinion and Justice Kagan’s dissent in Janus
concerned the force of stare decisis—the principle
that precedent should be followed even if erroneous,
absent overriding justification. This conflict recurred
in other cases, and it will again as the personnel of
the Court continues to change. As more conserva
tive judges join the Court, one should expect louder
appeals by the C ourt’s left wing for adherence to
stare decisis in an attempt to preserve and entrench
past gains. The more conservative judges, unhappy
with the trajectory of recent decades, will continue
to press for distinguishing, narrowing, or overrul
ing what they regard as the C ourt’s many wrong
doctrinal turns.

last t e r m

The four dissenting justices split. Justice Breyer,
joined by Justice Kagan, wrote a narrow, techni
cal, cold opinion that reads like an unsuccessful
attempt to peel off a justice from the majority. Jus
tice Sotomayor authored the other dissent, joined
by Justice Ginsburg. This more full-blooded dis
sent distinguished Kleindienst as inapplicable and
invoked Korematsu v. United States, the notorious
World War II-era case upholding the detention of
American citizens of Japanese descent in internment
camps. “By blindly accepting the Government’s
misguided invitation to sanction a discriminatory
policy motivated by animus, all in the name of a
superficial claim of national security,” Sotomayor
charged, “the Court redeploys the same dangerous
logic underlying Korematsu.'” Responding for the
majority, Roberts contended that Korematsu was
“wholly inapt.” “The forcible relocation of U.S. citi
zens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on
the basis of race,” Roberts wrote, “is objectively un
lawful and outside the scope of presidential author
ity.” Korematsu was entirely unlike the “facially
neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the
privilege of admission.”

ot all of the 1970s is destined to go
up in flames, however. In another
longside these significant First Amend
closely watched case, the more con
ment developments ran a second, less
servative justices relied heavily on a
noticed theme: the influence of social,
decision from the 1970s to douse a
technological, and moral change on Su
First Amendment conflagration. Trump v. Hawaii preme Court doctrine.
concerned President Donald Trump’s executive or
In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., for example, the
der stopping immigration from eight countries (later
growth of Internet commerce prompted an unusual
reduced to five, and with some exceptions from the
five-justice coalition finally to abandon a 1967 deci
listed countries). The third version of the so-called
sion, National Bellas Hess. Inc. v. Department o f
“Muslim travel ban” earned the sobriquet because of
Revenue o f Illinois, that prevented states from tax
controversial statements made by President Trump,
ing sales made by out-of-state merchants to in-state
including some from before he was elected.
residents. Doctrinal change in related areas and the
The constitutional objection to President Trump’s growth of mail-order businesses between 1967 and
order was that it discriminated against Muslims in
1992 had prompted one state supreme court to opine
violation of the First Amendment’s establishment
that “tremendous social, economic, commercial, and
clause. Writing for a bare majority, Chief Justice
legal innovations” of the intervening quarter century
Roberts argued that Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972)
had rendered National Bellas Hess obsolete. But in
easily disposed of the case because it limits judicial
1992, eight justices—including Justice Kennedy and
oversight of visa denials to any “facially legitimate
Justice Thomas—disagreed and reaffirmed it. This
year, Kennedy and Thomas changed their minds, and
and bona fide” reason the president might offer. That
meant no in-depth examination of all of President Justices Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch joined them
Trump’s utterances on the topic. Roberts actually
in reversing course. Not only was the 1992 refusal
scrutinized a little more than Kleindienst had en to overrule National Bellas Hess “wrong on its own
visioned, looking underneath the face of the order
terms,” wrote Kennedy in an opinion for the Court,
for a “rational basis” for it. But rational basis review
but “since then the Internet revolution has made its
is very circumscribed, and Roberts emphasized the
earlier error all the more egregious and harmful.”
limits of the Court’s power as respects a function al
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices
located to the executive branch within broad bound Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. These justices agreed
aries set by Congress.
that the precedents were wrong but believed that stare
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decisis called for leaving them in place. Congress, they
argued, not the Court, should address the problem.
Another variation on the theme of social change
influencing doctrinal change appeared in a very sig
nificant Fourth Amendment decision, Carpenter v.
United States. But this time Chief Justice Roberts
was in the majority, while Justices Kennedy, Thomas,
Alito, and Gorsuch dissented. The case concerned
the “third-party doctrine,” which provides that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
giving rise to Fourth Amendment protection in infor
mation handed over to third parties. The Court has
previously held, for instance, that individuals have no
Fourth Amendment privacy expectation in their bank
records because those are maintained by the bank, a
third party; same for the telephone numbers one calls
because those are transmitted to the phone company.
The question in Carpenter was whether the thirdparty doctrine permitted the government to obtain
data about a person’s location from wireless company
cell towers without first securing a warrant. Law en
forcement officials had tracked a robbery suspect,
Timothy Carpenter, after getting this kind of infor
mation from a wireless carrier using a special kind
of order that did not require the same showing of
suspicion needed for a warrant. The information thus
procured was “12,898 location points cataloging
Carpenter’s movements over 127 days—an average
of 101 data points per day.” Motivated perhaps by a
concern about how deeply intertwined our personal
lives have become with digital devices, Chief Justice
Roberts held that the third-party doctrine did not
authorize the government to obtain this information
without a search warrant. He was joined by Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The ma
jority insisted that it was not rejecting the third-party
doctrine more broadly. But lower courts will have to
figure out whether and how Carpenter’s reasoning
applies to other kinds of information we regularly
produce in the digital world.
While Carpenter illustrates that technological
change may narrow precedent, M urphy v. N C AA
shows that social and moral change may entrench
and extend it. Congress enacted the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) in the early
1990s to prevent the spread of sports gambling be
yond Nevada and a handful of other states. When
passed, the act gave New Jersey—home to Atlantic
City’s many casinos—one year to decide whether to
allow sports gambling. The state did not authorize
sports gambling by the deadline. A couple decades
later, however, New Jersey voters changed their
mind, but the NCAA and professional sports leagues

October 2018

went to court to stop New Jersey and enforce PASPA’s
prohibition. Here things get a little tricky. PASPA
does not make sports gambling a federal crime. But
it does prohibit New Jersey from repealing its own
prohibition of sports gambling. By a 7-2 vote, the Su
preme Court held that the federal government could
not handcuff the states in this manner.
Murphy extends and solidifies the Court’s “anti
commandeering” doctrine. In an earlier case, the Su
preme Court held that Congress could not directly
order states to pass particular laws. This kind of
national takeover of state legislative processes, the
Court said, is undemocratic because it enables both
Congress and the states to evade popular account
ability. Each can blame the other for the resulting
state of the law. Writing for the Court in Murphy,
Justice Alito reasoned that there was no real differ
ence between ordering states to enact laws and pro
hibiting them from repealing laws. Although earlier
anti-commandeering cases had been viewed as vul
nerable “states’ rights” cases because of the narrow
and ideologically inflected majorities by which they
had been decided, the fact that Justices Breyer and
Kagan joined Alito’s opinion for the Court shows
that anti-commandeering doctrine is here to stay.
The social, economic, and moral impact of Mur
phy is likely to be substantial. Since the decision was
handed down, a number of states have moved to le
galize sports gambling. Social conservatives may re
gret this outcome; indeed, the decision will probably
be most damaging to those least capable of coping
with the vice of gambling. But from another point
of view, a strong anti-commandeering doctrine ob
structs social engineers from fobbing off responsibil
ity for objectionable policies.
wo cases involving the constitutionality
of partisan gerrymandering brought the
relationship among cultural change, per
sonnel change, and doctrinal change to
gether with another leitmotif of the term:
the limits of judicial power.
Current constitutional doctrine for drawing vot
ing district lines requires that districts must contain
roughly equal numbers of people and that racial con
siderations may not predominate. The question posed
by partisan gerrymandering claims is whether there is
a third rule that partisan political considerations may
not play an excessive role in district drawing. Since
first holding in 1986 that intentional disadvantag
ing of the voters of one party presents a justiciable
partisan gerrymandering claim, the Supreme Court
has failed for more than thirty years to articulate
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Trump v. Hawaii, political process cases involving
political and racial gerrymandering, and a range of
statutory interpretation and business cases. This re
cord suggests that, should Judge Brett Kavanaugh be
confirmed, we ought to expect a fair amount of con
tinuity rather than radical change.
But in other major areas—areas that happen not
to have been addressed this term—the change may
be more substantial. Consider, for example, the con
stitutional law of abortion. Here, Kennedy’s replace
ment might make a difference, particularly if there is
a possibility that a Justice Kavanaugh might join with
four colleagues in ending the regime of constitutional
abortion law initiated by Roe v. Wade.
Social conservatives have been disappointed be
fore. The Court’s first major abortion case after Jus
tice Kennedy joined the Court was the 1989 decision
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, where it
seemed there might be five votes to overrule Roe.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote an opinion
for four justices that purported to “modify and nar
row ” Roe, but Reagan-nominated Justice Sandra
Day O ’Connor went her own way, introducing the
“undue burden” standard that has remained the law
until today. Scalia, meanwhile, lamented that this
missed opportunity to reverse Roe meant that “the
mansion of constitutional abortion law, constructed
overnight in Roe, must be disassembled doorjamb
by doorjamb, and never entirely brought down, no
matter how wrong it may be.” Scalia was farseeing.
Four years later, in Planned Parenthood o f South
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Kennedy joined with
O’Connor and Justice David Souter to preserve what
they called “the central holding” of Roe.
We are guardedly optimistic that Kavanaugh’s
confirmation will eventually result in the rejection of
Roe v. Wade. But nobody should expect a quick or
complete demolition of constitutional abortion rights.
Caution is in order because of both internal Court
dynamics and external pressure on the institution.
The shift on the new Court should be m ea
sured not by the distance between Kennedy and
Kavanaugh, but between Kennedy and Roberts. On
a multi-member Court, the views of the median jus
hat, then, should we expect from
tice matter most in the close cases implicating the
the post-Kennedy Court? Perhaps
culture wars. And Roberts cares deeply about public
more of the same. There was not
perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy. The same con
a single 5-4 decision this term in
cerns that motivate Roberts to embrace minimalism
which Justice Kennedy joined with
more has
broadly,
the more liberal wing of the Court. That
never as in the cases this term about parti
san gerrymandering and sales taxes, will likely mean
before happened on the Roberts Court. And there
even greater caution in these hotter and angrier areas
were fourteen 5 -4 cases in which Kennedy joined
of constitutional law.
with the four more conservative justices to form a
Neither should we forget that the result of over
majority, including First Amendment cases such as
ruling
the Roe/Casey regime is no panacea. It would
Janus and NIFLA, separation of powers cases like

administrable standards for evaluating these claims.
In 2004, four justices argued that such claims were
nonjusticiable because there was no plausible stan
dard for deciding how much politics was too much.
The lower courts, wrote Justice Antonin Scalia,
had been “wandering in the wilderness for eighteen
years.” But the other five justices, including Justice
Kennedy, wanted to keep trying.
And so the lower courts have continued to wander,
while the academic constitutional clerisy has devel
oped a profusion of theories that address the evil of
excessive partisan gerrymandering. Many believed
the Supreme Court would finally settle on a standard
this term. But that was not to be. In Gill v. Whitford,
the Court reversed a decision that threw out the en
tire Wisconsin districting plan as an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander. But the justices disposed of the
case on standing grounds: The Court held that no
plaintiff had a right to challenge all of the districts,
only those that affected one’s rights personally, as a
voter in that district. Benisek v. Lamone was a sec
ond partisan gerrymandering case disposed of unani
mously on non-merits grounds. Unlike Gill, this was
a single district challenge. But because of legal uncer
tainty about political gerrymandering claims gener
ally and the poor timing of the plaintiffs’ complaint,
the Court held that the lower court had not abused
its discretion in denying relief.
Taken together, Gill and Benisek are best under
stood as decisions not to decide too much. At one lev
el, these cases can be understood simply as instances
of a principle Chief Justice Roberts articulated early
in his tenure: “If it is not necessary to decide more to
a case, then in my view it is necessary not to decide
more to a case.” But there may be deeper signifi
cance to these cases as well. They may signal that
the Court is coming to realize, albeit gradually and
reluctantly, that it should never have led the lower
courts on this merry chase to micromanage what are
political decisions. After all, neither the Constitution
nor the Supreme Court can deliver us from every
political evil.
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simply lift restrictions on state legislation. But that is
hardly always desirable. We can surely expect some,
perhaps many, states to follow the lead of Massa
chusetts, where legislators passed a NASTY (Negat
ing Archaic Stereotypes Targeting Young) Women
Act that repealed abortion restrictions that might in
theory have come back into force if Roe/Casey were
overturned. New York’s governor has made exten
sive abortion rights a rallying cry of his campaign
for reelection.
Just as the damage done by Roe/Casey is not
exclusively legal, neither will it be undone by legal
means alone. The Court and dominant cultural opin
ion shape each other, and the arrow of influence runs
in both directions. However much “the mansion of
constitutional abortion law” may be dismantled,
the constitutional rot at its foundation is the result
of powerful cultural forces. Let us not put our trust
in judges any more than princes, not only because
they are fallible, but also because judges are meant
to judge, not to save us from ourselves.

not against foreign enemies, but against large con
stituencies of Americans, the “deplorables” whose
religious and moral views have suffered decades of
sustained assault. What began as a legal war against
recalcitrant Southern segregationists in the 1950s has
mutated into something entirely different: a multi
front campaign to destroy “haters,” who turn out to
be a significant plurality, and perhaps even a major
ity, of Americans.
The Supreme Court in recent years has provided
religious conservatives some respite. This protective
function is real and important. But by the time these
culture war cases end up in courts, conservatives
are usually fighting rearguard actions. As we write,
Jack Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop are back in
court, trying to stave off yet another attempt by the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission to use state antidiscrimination law to show him, and the nation, who
is really in charge.
Even if the courts continue to provide all the de
fensive protection that dissenters seek, and even if
the courts end the aggressive judicial creation of new
eginning in the mid-twentieth century, the
rights, the war will go on outside the courts. Even
Court inserted itself into all manner of cul if the Supreme Court reaffirms that there is no con
tural and social conflicts—about the na stitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, for ex
ture of the human person, sexual mores,
ample, states such as California will persist in their
church-state relations, and many other
commitment to suicide as a fundamental component
subjects. It purported to resolve cultural disagree
of a perverse view of human dignity and autonomy.
ment by judicial fiat, and it earned a certain kind of
Our cultural conflicts are over the political good, the
prestige for its decisions, channeling the consensus of moral good, and most fundamentally, what it means to
an elite constituency. Over the last two generations,
be human. The Supreme Court cannot resolve them.
America’s cultural, intellectual, and legal leaders
True, legal power can provide protection on certain
have become partisans in an increasingly bitter war
fraught battlefields. But the war will go on. 13
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